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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN M. STILLING, : 
Petitioner/Appellee, : Case No. 950818-CA 
v. : 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND : Priority No. 3 
PAROLE; 0. LANE McCOTTER, 
Executive Director, Utah : 
Department of Corrections; 
and the STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondents/Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The district court erred in determining that the Utah 
Board of Pardons and Parole (the Board) lacks statutory authority 
to order restitution as a condition of parole. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district courtfs interpretation of 
a statute presents a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness, according no particular deference to the district 
court's decision. State v. Strader. 902 P.2d 638, 640 
(Utah App. 1995) . 
2. The district court erred in determining that the Board's 
assessment of restitution as a condition of Stilling's parole 
violated the Utah Constitution's prohibition against ex post 
facto laws. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's conclusion that the 
Board violated Stilling's rights under the Utah Constitution is a 
question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. State 
v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). 
3. The district court erred in determining that allowing 
the Board to assess restitution as a condition of parole exceeds 
the authority granted it by article VII, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: The district court's constitutional 
interpretation involves a question of law which this Court 
reviews for correctness. State v. Contrel. 886 P.2d 107, 111 
(Utah App. 1994), cert, denied. 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The text of all constitutional provisions and statutes 
pertinent to resolution of the issues before this Court is 
contained in Addendum B of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner Steven M. Stilling filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief against the respondents on July 6, 1994, 
alleging that the Board violated his rights under the Utah 
Constitution by ordering restitution as a condition of his parole 
where no restitution had been ordered by the trial court at the 
time he was sentenced for the underlying offenses. R. at 1-10. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Stilling moved for summary judgment on July 19, 1995, 
asserting that by ordering him to make restitution as a condition 
of parole, the Board (1) exceeded the authority granted it by 
article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and 
(2) violated the Utah Constitution's ban against ex post facto 
laws. R. at 67-76. The district court granted Stilling's motion 
on October 12, 1995. (A copy of the district court's order is 
attached hereto as Addendum A.) The district court expressly 
held that (1) Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 (1995), which 
address the Board's authority to order restitution, do not allow 
the Board to order restitution in cases such as this, and (2) 
application of these sections, which were not effective at the 
time Stilling was sentenced on the underlying offenses, violates 
3 
the Utah Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws. 
R. at 126-135. The district court additionally suggested that 
permitting the Board to order restitution in the present case 
would exceed the authority granted under article VII, section 12 
of the Utah Constitution by allowing the Board "to don the robe 
of the judiciary and decide the amount of restitution owed as a 
result of the underlying criminal act when restitution was not 
ordered in the original sentencing proceeding." R. at 129. 
C. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On February 13, 1985, Steven M. Stilling was sentenced for 
three aggravated robbery offenses; no restitution was ordered by 
the district court at the time of sentencing. R. at 22-24. 
Following hearings on August 13 and 24, 1993, the Board granted 
Stilling a parole date of May 24, 1994. At that time, the Board 
further determined that a restitution hearing should be held to 
determine the amount of restitution, if any, that Stilling must 
pay as a condition of his parole. R. at 54-56. On April 28, 
1994, the Board held a restitution hearing at which Stilling was 
present. The hearing officer determined that restitution was 
proper and ordered restitution as a condition of Stilling's 
parole. R. at 57. Stilling was subsequently paroled on May 24, 
1994. R. at 36, 69. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court improperly granted summary judgment in 
favor of petitioner Stilling. First, the district court erred in 
determining the Board lacks statutory authority to order 
restitution as a condition of parole. Second, the district court 
erred in determining that the Board's assessment of restitution 
as a condition of Stilling's parole violated the Utah 
Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws. Third, 
the district court erred in determining that allowing the Board 
to assess restitution as a condition of parole exceeds the 
authority granted it by article VII, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. Accordingly, the district court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Stilling should be reversed. 
ARgUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT THE BOARD LACKS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO 
ORDER RESTITUTION AS A CONDITION OF PAROLE 
The district court interpreted Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and 
77-27-6 (1995), which address the Board's authority to order 
restitution, as prohibiting the Board from assessing restitution 
as a condition of parole where no restitution had been ordered by 
the trial court at the time of sentencing. Specifically, the 
district court held that the Board is authorized to order 
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restitution in only two limited contexts, (1) when restitution 
was imposed by the trial court as part of the underlying sentence 
and (2) when the State, the Department of Corrections, or any 
other State agency incur costs "that arise due to the 
petitioner's needs or conduct." However, the district court's 
interpretation of sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 clearly 
contradicts the plain language of those sections. 
It is well settled that a statute should be construed 
according to its plain language. Vtflh Sign, IftCt v, Ut9h Pep't 
of Transp.. 896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah 1995). Thus, when statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, appellate courts do not look 
beyond it to surmise the legislature's intent. Brinkerhoff v. 
Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). Moreover, "unambiguous 
language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its 
plain meaning.'' Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) 
(per curiam). 
At the time of Stilling's parole hearings, section 77-27-5 
stated: 
(1)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
determine by majority decision when and under what 
conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of 
the state, persons committed to serve sentences in 
. . . all felony cases except treason or impeachment or 
as otherwise limited by law, may be released upon 
parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their 
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fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their 
sentences commuted or terminated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (1995). Thus, the plain language of 
this section provides that subject to the limitations prescribed 
by chapter 27 and by other state laws, the Board has complete 
authority to order restitution. 
One such limitation is contained in section 77-27-5(1) (c), 
which states in part, uNo restitution may be ordered . . . except 
after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed 
examiner in open session." Id. However, this limitation was met 
in the present case, a fact that Stilling does not contest. 
Another limitation is found in section 77-27-5(5), which 
provides: 
In determining when, where, and under what 
conditions offenders serving sentences may be paroled, 
pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have their fines 
or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or 
terminated, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
consider whether the persons have made or are prepared 
to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with 
the standards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a 
condition of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or 
forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence. 
Id. Under this section, the Board is simply required to consider 
whether restitution has already been ordered and made in 
accordance with a trial court's sentencing order before assessing 
restitution as a condition of parole. Thus, inasmuch as the 
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trial court did not order restitution at the time of sentencing 
in the present case, the limitations found in section 77-27-5(5) 
are not relevant here. 
A further clarification of the Board's authority to order 
restitution was subsequently added in section 77-27-5(1)(e), 
which states: "The board shall determine restitution in an 
amount that does not exceed complete restitution if determined by 
the court in accordance with Section 76-3-201." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-27-5(1) (e) (Supp. 1995). The plain language of this section 
limits the amount of restitution that the Board may assess in 
cases in which the trial court has already determined the proper 
amount of restitution. Again, this section is not applicable to 
the instant case because no restitution had been previously 
ordered at the time of sentencing, and therefore, the Board is 
not limited by section 77-27-5(1)(e) to a specific restitution 
amount previously determined by a court. In fact, section 
77-27-5(1) (e) implicitly supports the Board's authority to assess 
restitution in cases in which restitution has not been ordered by 
the trial court at the time of sentencing. By stating that the 
Board is limited in the amount of restitution amount it may 
assess in instances where restitution has been ordered by the 
trial court at the time of sentencing, section 77-27-5(1) (e) 
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necessarily implies that there are other instances in which the 
Board is not likewise limited in the amount of restitution it may 
order. Because Judge Lewis's reading of the statute would 
effectively render this portion meaningless and void, such 
interpretation cannot stand. See Nelson v. Salt Lake County. 905 
P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995); gtQgord FerrO v, Vtfrh Pep't of 
Commerce. 828 P.2d 507, 513 (Utah App. 1992). 
Like section 77-27-5, section 77-27-6 also provides support 
for the Board's authority to order restitution. That section 
states, in pertinent part: 
When the Board of Pardons and Parole orders the 
release of an inmate who has been sentenced to make 
restitution pursuant tP Section 75-3-2Q1 sn whom the 
board has ordered to make restitution, and all or a 
portion of restitution is still owing, the board may 
establish a schedule including both complete and court-
ordered restitution, by which payment of the 
restitution shall be made, or order community or other 
service in lieu of or in combination with restitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-6(1) (1995) (emphasis added). Clearly, 
the use of the disjunctive, "or," contemplates that the Board 
may, by its own authority, order restitution. 
Moreover, even if the district court correctly read the 
language of sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 as expressly authorizing 
the Board to order restitution in the two specific instances laid 
out in subsections 77-27-6(2) and -6(3), there is nothing in 
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those sections, or elsewhere in state law, that limits the Board 
to assessing restitution only in such cases. Because the Board's 
authority is not thereby limited, the Board's action is proper, 
even if not expressly authorized, under its general authority to 
"determine by majority decision when and under what conditions 
. . . persons committed to serve sentences in . . . all felony 
cases . . . may be released upon parole." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-27-5(1) (a) (1995) . 
In any event, the district court's interpretation of 
sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 as prohibiting the Board from 
ordering restitution in this case is clearly contrary to the 
plain language contained therein and is, therefore, incorrect as 
a matter of law. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT THE BOARD'S ASSESSMENT OF RESTITUTION AS 
A CONDITION OF STILLING'S PAROLE VIOLATED THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION'S PROHIBITION AGAINST 
EX POST FACTO LAWS 
As an alternative ground for its ruling, the district court 
held that the Board's assessment of restitution against Stilling 
in the instant case violated the Utah Constitution's prohibition 
against ex post facto laws. Except for stylistic changes, the 
above versions of sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 became effective 
on April 1, 1985. Pursuant to the authority granted by those 
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sections, restitution was ordered by the Board as a condition of 
Stilling's parole in April 1994. However, the district court 
held that since Stilling was originally sentenced for the three 
underlying aggravated robbery offenses in February 1985, 
application of sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 to him would increase 
his punishment and therefore such application would be ex post 
facto. Respondents respectfully disagree. 
Article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution states: 
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed." uAn ex post facto law 
is one that, inter alia, 'makes more burdensome the punishment 
for a crime, after its commission."' State v. Burgess. 870 P.2d 
276, 278 n.3 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Norton. 675 
P.2d 577, 585 (Utah 1983), cert, denied. 466 U.S. 942 (1984), 
overruled on other grounds by St3te Vt Hunger}; 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 
1986)) . 
However, in the instant case, assessment of restitution 
under section 77-27-5 as a condition of parole does not increase 
Stillingfs punishment. As always, his sentence is three 
one-to-fifteen year terms, and Stilling had the option to reject 
the conditions of parole and serve out the remainder of his 
sentence. Mansell v. Turner. 14 Utah 2d 352, 353, 384 P.2d 394, 
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395 (Utah 1963). The imposition of restitution as a condition of 
parole is simply that, a condition to Stilling being permitted 
the privilege of parole. Thus, no violation of the ex post facto 
provision of the Utah Constitution has occurred. See Burgess, 
870 P.2d at 278 n.3; Norton. 675 P.2d at 586. 
Other states have reached a similar conclusion. In White v. 
People. 866 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that requiring parolee to participate in a sex 
offender treatment program that did not exist when parolee was 
originally sentenced did not constitute additional punishment, 
but merely the denial of the privilege of parole. Consequently, 
such a requirement did not violate ex post facto clause. Id. at 
1374. Similarly, in Msllinger v, Iflfrhp Pep't pf CprreCtJPRg, 757 
P.2d 1213 (Idaho App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that 
conditions of parole are not additional punishments for the crime 
for which parolee was incarcerated, but simply grounds for losing 
parole. Id. at 1218. 
Furthermore, it is well settled that parole proceedings are 
not criminal proceedings. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that double jeopardy guarantees are not violated "when a 
defendant is convicted of criminal charges and those same face 
are used as grounds for revoking the defendant's parole." 
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Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336, 1337 (Utah 1986) (citing State 
v. Bullock. 589 P.2d 777 (Utah 1979)); egqprd Hatch v. Deland. 
790 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah App. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by 
Labrum v. Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993). Similarly, 
since parole proceedings are not criminal in nature, the 
imposition of restitution as a condition of parole following such 
a hearing cannot be viewed as the imposition of a second 
punishment for the underlying crime. 
"A statutory amendment does not violate the ex post facto 
clause merely because it works to the detriment of the accused." 
Norton. 675 P.2d at 585 (citing Beazell v. Ohio. 269 U.S. 167, 
170 (1925)). It must also affect an accrued right of the 
accused. Id. at 586. In this case, Stilling's sentence has not 
changed. The change at issue here is simply a change in the law 
regarding conditions of parole. Since no expectation of certain 
conditions of parole accrued to Stilling until the time of his 
parole hearing, well after sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 were 
passed, application of those sections to him cannot be said to be 
applied ex post facto. 
Moreover, Andrews v. Utah Board of Pardons. 836 P.2d 790, 
793 (Utah 1992), upon which the district court relied in support 
of its conclusion that application of sections 77-27-5 and 
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77-27-6 to Stilling is ex post facto, is readily distinguishable. 
In Andrews. the Utah Supreme Court, in the context of deciding 
whether to grant Andrews' petition for a commutation hearing, 
held that application of substantive standards that had been 
passed subsequent to the time at which the crime was committed 
would diminish Andrews' opportunity for commutation in violation 
of article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 793. 
However, in the present case, the Board had plenary authority to 
order restitution both at the time that Stilling committed the 
underlying offenses and at the time of his parole hearing. Thus, 
Andrews is not controlling here. 
At the time the underlying offenses were committed, the case 
law clearly supported the Board's plenary authority, absent an 
abuse of discretion, to place conditions including restitution on 
parole. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, "The plenary 
authority of the Board of Pardons should not be disturbed in the 
absence of a clear abuse of its rightful discretion." Ward v. 
Smith. 573 P.2d 781, 782 (1978).x See also Utah Code Ann. 
Stilling claims that the Board lost its plenary power after 
article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution was amended in 
1980 to give the legislature authorization to enact standards 
governing when persons convicted of various crimes are eligible 
for parole. However, that amendment did not eliminate the 
Board's plenary power. In fact, in State v. Kent, 665 P.2d 1317 
14 
§ 77-27-1 (1982) (defining parole as release from imprisonment on 
conditions prescribed by the Board which the parolee must 
satisfactorily perform in order to be entitled to a termination 
of sentence). In fact, even banishment has been upheld as a 
valid condition of parole. Mansell v. Turner. 14 Utah 2d 352, 
384 P.2d 394 (1963). The breadth of the Board's plenary powers 
was plainly set forth in section 77-27-3, which stated that 
u[t]he board of pardons shall determine, by majority decision, 
when and under what conditions, subject to the provisions of this 
chapter, persons now or hereafter serving sentences, in all cases 
except treason or impeachments, or as otherwise limited by law, 
may be released upon parole." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-3(1) 
(1982). That section additionally provided that xx[t]he 
determinations and decisions of the board of pardons in cases 
involving approval or denial of any action whatsoever . . . shall 
(Utah 1983), a post-amendment case, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly reaffirmed the position it took in Ward, stating: 
"Parole is a conditional release, the condition being 
that the prisoner make good or be returned to serve his 
unexpired time. It is a privilege, an act of grace, as 
distinguished from a right. Parole is not absolute liberty 
as all law-abiding citizens enjoy, but only conditional 
liberty dependent upon compliance with parole restrictions. 
The parolee remains in legal custody until such time as his 
sentence is terminated." 
Kent. 665 P.2d at 1319 (quoting Ward. 573 P.2d at 782) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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be final." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-3(2) (1982). Thus, even prior 
to the express authority to order restitution found in sections 
77-27-5 and 77-27-6, the Board had the implicit authority to 
order restitution under its plenary powers. 
Similarly, after sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 were amended, 
the Board continued to have the authority to order restitution. 
"Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving paroles, 
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, 
or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not 
subject to judicial review.'' Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1995) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, application of sections 77-27-5 
and 77-27-6 to Stilling is not ex post facto because the 
enactment of those sections did not diminish Stilling's rights. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT ALLOWING THE BOARD TO ASSESS RESTITUTION 
AS A CONDITION OF PAROLE EXCEEDS THE 
AUTHORITY GRANTED IT BY ARTICLE VII, SECTION 
12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
In rendering its decision in this matter, the district court 
did not directly address Stilling's claim that permitting the 
Board to order restitution in the present case would exceed the 
authority granted the Board under article VII, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution. However, the court did suggest that result 
when it stated that it would be improper to allow the Board 
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"to don the robe of the judiciary and decide the amount of 
restitution owed as a result of the underlying criminal act when 
restitution was not ordered in the original sentencing 
proceeding." Therefore, it is necessary for respondents to 
address petitioner's article VII, section 12 claim. 
When faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute, 
"the act is presumed valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts 
in favor of constitutionality," Society of Separationists, Inc. 
v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993). "Additionally, 
while we must give effect to constitutional mandates, we must 
also attempt to reconcile the challenged statute with the 
constitution, particularly if the constitutional mandate is 
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." State v. 
Robertson. 886 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Timpanogos 
planning fr W^ter Management Agenqy v, Central Utah Water 
Conservancy Dist.. 690 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah 1984)), cert, granted. 
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). In other words, this Court will 
"afford the statute every presumption of validity, so long as 
there is a reasonable basis upon which both provisions of the 
statute and the mandate of the constitution may be reconciled." 
Timpanogos. 690 P.2d at 564. 
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Article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides in 
pertinent part:2 
(2)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by 
majority vote and upon other conditions as provided by 
statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures and 
restitution orders, commute punishments, and grant 
pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason 
and impeachments, subject to regulations provided by 
statute. 
Utah Const, art. VII, § 12 (Supp. 1995). 
Stilling claims that since this section does not specify 
that the Board may order restitution, the Board is therefore 
forbidden from doing so. However, this is not necessarily so. 
As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated in 
2Prior to its 1992 amendment, article VII, section 12 stated 
in relevant part: 
Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, 
Justices of the Supreme Court and Attorney General 
shall constitute a Board of Pardons, a majority of 
whom, including the Governor, upon such conditions as 
may be established by the Legislature, may remit fines 
and forfeitures, commute punishments, and grant pardons 
after convictions, in all cases except treason and 
impeachment, subject to such regulations as may be 
provided by law, relative to the manner of applying for 
pardons; but no fine or forfeiture shall be remitted, 
and no commutation or pardon granted, except after a 
full hearing before the Board, in open session, after 
previous notice of the time and place of such hearing 
has been given. 
Utah Const., art. VII, § 12 (1991). However, since the 1992 
amendment did not substantively change this section, respondents 
will refer to this section in its current format. 
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United States v. Mesa-Rincon. 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990): 
"'The motto of the Prussian state--that everything which is not 
permitted is forbidden--is not a helpful guide to statutory 
interpretation."' Id. at 1437 n.3 (quoting United States v. 
Torresi 751 F.2d 875, 880 (7th cir. 1984)); accorfl Natural gflg 
Pipeline Co. v, Energy gathering, IncT, 2 F.3d 1397, 1407 (5th 
Cir. 1993), cert, denied. --- U.S. ---, 114 S. Ct. 882 (1994); 
gee al?P State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116, 1121-1126 (Utah 
1980) (holding that local governments have independent authority 
apart from, and in addition to, specific legislative grants of 
authority, to engage in activities reasonably related to the 
exercise of the powers granted them). The same can be said of 
constitutional interpretation in the present case: Simply 
because the Utah Constitution does not specify that the Board may 
order restitution does not indicate that the Board is 
constitutionally prohibited from doing so. 
To the contrary, it is well settled that an agency of the 
executive branch which has been granted powers under the Utah 
Constitution is not strictly limited solely to the enumerated 
powers set forth in the constitution. For instance, Howell v. 
County Bd. ex rel. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 881 P.2d 880 (Utah 1994), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that in order to carry out its 
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constitutional mandate, the Utah State Tax Commission necessarily 
had authority in addition to the powers expressly given it in the 
constitution. Id. at 889-90. Specifically, the court determined 
that the tax commission had the authority to promulgate a set of 
uniform standards governing charitable exemptions. Id. at 889. 
Moreover, it reached this conclusion despite the fact that this 
authority is not expressly granted the tax commission in the 
constitution. Similarly, in the present case, despite the fact 
that article VII, section 12, does not expressly state that the 
Board of Pardons may order restitution, it does not forbid it, 
and must be read in conjunction sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 to 
allow it. 
This is especially so here in light of the general enabling 
language of article VII, section 12 that "[t]he Board of Pardons 
. . . may grant parole . . . subject to regulations provided by 
statute." Thus, the Legislature did not circumvent the Utah 
Constitution by enacting sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6, but merely 
provided more definition to the Board's constitutionally-mandated 
power to grant parole. Likewise, in the instant case, the Board 
simply exercised its constitutional power to grant parole subject 
to the regulations provided in sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6. As 
such, the Board did not exceed its constitutional authority. 
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Finally, as the Utah Supreme Court has previously 
recognized: "For all intents and purposes, adoption of this 
indeterminate sentencing system transformed the Board from an 
agency having the ability to shorten a prisonerfs 
judge-determined sentence into an agency with power analogous to 
that of a court to actually impose a sentence." Neel v. Holden. 
886 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1994). Thus, given Utah's 
indeterminate sentencing scheme, allowing the Board to Mon the 
robes of the judiciary" in these circumstances is not only 
permitted, but proper. See Labrum v. Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d 
902, 908 (Utah 1993); FPPtS Vt Utfrh PA- Of Pflycfon?, 808 P.2d 734, 
735 (Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner Steven M. 
Stilling should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this d\ day of February, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
-NORMAN E. PLATE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Steven M. Stilling, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
: Case Number 940904258 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
Utah Board of Pardons and Parole; : 
O. Lane McCotter, Executive 
Director, Utah Department of : 
Corrections; and the State of Utah, 
Respondents. : 
This case is before the Court on Mr. Stilling's motion for summary judgment. Mr. 
Stilling was sentenced on February 13, 1985. On May 24, 1994, the Utah Board of Pardons 
and Parole ("Board") granted Mr. Stilling a parole date conditioned upon his payment of 
restitution. The Board's order dated June 2, 1995 is difficult to read, but it appears to list the 
restitution owed as "$6613.57 (on #CR 83-176); $17,305.00 (on #16269, #16272 and #16271), 
and $92.00 (on Extradition case #90-1900390)." The petitioner contends that the Board is not 
authorized to order him to pay the $17,305.00 identified with case numbers 16269, 16272 and 
16271 since he was not ordered to pay restitution in the underlying sentence.1 
!This claim is set forth in the Petition for Extraordinary Relief on page 4, paragraph 15. The Respondent 
incorrectly asserts in its Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment that the Petitioner 
complains about a case in which the judge has ordered restitution. 
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The Board's position is that Utah Code §77-27-5, authorizes it to order restitution even 
if there is no court order of restitution. That statute was passed February 26, 1985 and was 
effective April, 1985. The petitioner's position is that application of §77-27-5 and §77-27-6 to 
him, violates the ban against ex post facto laws since he was sentenced on February 13, 1985, 
a few months before the statutes' effective date,2 and application of this law increases the 
punishment imposed. The State's response to this argument is that application of the law is not 
ex post facto since the statute was effective on the date that petitioner was paroled, and the order 
of restitution does not increase the punishment but is a mere condition of parole. Alternatively, 
the State opines that the Board had plenary power to order restitution on the date that petitioner 
was sentenced. 
After a careful study of Utah Code §77-27-5 and §77-27-6, the Court finds that the Board 
is authorized to impose restitution in two limited contexts. First, the Board may impose or 
enforce any court order for restitution, under Utah Code §77-27-6(2). Second, the Board may 
order restitution for costs that arise due to the petitioner's needs or conduct and incurred by the 
Department of Corrections or the state or any other agency. Utah Code §77-27-6(3). However, 
the Board is not authorized by this statute to order restitution for pecuniary loss related to the 
underlying offense when restitution was not a part of the sentencing court's order. 
2Actually, the defendant's position is that the 1986 amendments to §77-27-5 and §77-27-6 do not apply to him. 
However, the statutes were actually effective in 1985, with minor amendments being made in 1986. However, this 
confusion on the part of the defendant does not change the fact that the statute was effective after he was sentenced. 
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Utah Code §77-27-5 describes the Board's authority. The pertinent sections are set out 
below: 
77-27-5 Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
(l)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision when and 
under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state, persons 
committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional 
facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony 
cases except treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released 
upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution 
remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. 
(l)(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount that does not exceed complete 
restitution3 if determined by the court in accordance with Section 76-3-201. 
77-27-6 Payment of restitution. 
(1) When the Board of Pardons and Parole orders the release on parole of an inmate who 
has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to Section 76-3-201 or whom the board 
has ordered to make restitution, and all or a portion of restitution is still owing, the board 
may establish a schedule, including both complete and court-ordered restitution, by which 
payment of the restitution shall be made, or order community or other service in lieu of 
or in combination with restitution. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled 
offender's performance, the board may consider the factors specified in Subsection 76-3-
201(4). 
(2) The board may impose any court order for restitution and order that a defendant make 
restitution in an amount not to exceed the pecuniary damages to the victim of the offense 
of which the defendant has been convicted, the victim of any other criminal conduct 
admitted to by the defendant to the sentencing court, or for conduct for which the 
defendant has agreed to make restitution as a part of a plea agreement, unless the board 
applying the criteria as set forth in Subsection 76-3-201(4) determines that restitution is 
inappropriate. 
(3) The board may also make orders of restitution for recovery of any or all costs 
incurred by the Department of Corrections or the state or any other agency arising our 
of the defendant's needs or conduct. 
[emphasis added] 
The general authority of the Board to order restitution is granted in Section 77-27-5; 
however, that authority is limited by the language, "subject to this chapter and other laws of the 
"Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the 
defendant." Utah Code §76-3-201(4)(cXi). 
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State" emphasized above. Limits on the Board's authority to order restitution are described in 
Section 77-27-5(l)(e) and in Section 77-27-6, First, the Board may only order an amount of 
restitution that does not exceed the sentencing court's determination of the amount necessary to 
compensate the victim for all losses caused by the defendant, if the court considered and 
determined complete restitution was required. The implication of this language is that if the 
sentencing court did not order complete restitution, the Board may not stand in the place of the 
court and make a judicial determination of restitution. 
The Board's authority to order restitution is further delineated in Section 77-27-6, entitled 
"Payment of restitution/ That statute clearly states that the Board may impose any court order 
for restitution, or the Board may make orders of restitution for recovery of any or all costs 
arising out of the defendant's needs or conduct and incurred by the Department of Corrections, 
the state, or any other agency. Those are the only two situations in which the Board is 
authorized to order restitution. The statute does not authorize the Board to don the robe of the 
judiciary and decide the amount of restitution owed as a result of the underlying criminal act 
when restitution was not ordered in the original sentencing proceeding.4 
The Court disagrees with the petitioner's statement that "in enacting Utah Code Ann. §§77-27-5 and 6 (Rep. 
Vol. 8B 1995), the legislature attempted to grant judicial power to the Board because those provisions specifically 
reference the statutory standard [i.e. §77-3-201] to be employed by sentencing judges as the standards to govern 
the Board as well" (Petitioner's Memorandum In Support Of Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment, p.3.) 
A careful reading of the statute reveals that it directs the Board to use the criteria of §77-3-201 when fixing the 
schedule and supervising the offender's repayment performances (§77-27-6(1)) or in making a determination that 
restitution is inappropriate (§77-27-6(2)). Although the statute is poorly drafted and confusing, the legislature has 
not granted the Board power to sua sponte sentence an offender to pay restitution for pecuniary damages of the 
underlying crime when restitution was not a part of the court's order. 
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Further support for the Court's position is found in Utah Code §76-3-201(4). This section 
directs the court to order restitution where appropriate, and sets out very specific criteria and 
procedures that the court is to follow. If the court determines that restitution is appropriate, the 
court must set out specific reasons for its decision as a part of the court record, and if the 
defendant objects to the imposition, amount or distribution of restitution, the court shall allow 
the defendant a full hearing on that issue at the time of sentencing. Clearly, an order of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole to pay restitution for the pecuniary costs of the underlying crime 
deprives the defendant of his rights to a fiill hearing before a neutral tribunal. 
Assuming arguendo that the legislature empowered the Board to order restitution for an 
underlying offense when restitution was not a part of the original sentence, the Court finds, as 
an additional basis for this decision and as a matter of law, that the application of Sections 77-
27-5 and 77-27-6 to this petitioner is retroactive and increases the punishment and burden on the 
petitioner. Thus, application of Sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 is barred. 
The Utah supreme court spoke to the issue of retroactivity in Andrews v. Utah Bd. of 
Pardons, 836 P.2d 790 (Utah 1992). In that case, the court held that amendments to the 
statutory scheme governing the procedures of the Board (§77-27-5.5) cannot be applied to 
inmates who committed their crimes prior to the enactment of the new statute if the statute is 
detrimental to the inmate. Id. at 793. Application of such amendments would violate Article I, 
Section 18 of the Utah Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws as well as Article I, Section 10 
of the United States Constitution. Id. 
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Likewise, in Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court used 
a traditional statutory analysis when considering the retroactive application of a statute. Smith 
was sentenced under a statute which was later amended so that the length of probation was 
shortened. The court rejected Smith's argument that the later amendment should apply to his 
case. The court explained that as a general rule, a statute is applied only prospectively. 
However, if a statute is considered procedural or remedial then the statute may be applied 
retroactively. A statute is "considered procedural or remedial, as opposed to substantive, if the 
statute does not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested rights. " Id. at 792. Because this statute 
enlarged the rights of a person placed on probation, it was substantive, and therefore could not 
be applied retroactively. The court also noted that it has consistently held, "the law in force at 
the time of sentencing governfs] and ... that an amendment to [a] statute passed after sentence 
has no effect on the matter." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990). 
The Smith court's analysis tracks that of the United States Supreme Court in Dobbert v. 
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298,53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), wherein the court 
held that an ex post facto statute is one that 'punishes as a crime an act previously committed, 
which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for the crime, 
after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available 
according to law at the time when the act was committed.* (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 
167, 169-170, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). 
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Applying the law to the facts in this case, the Court finds that the petitioner was 
sentenced on February 13,1985, two months before the effective date of Utah Code 77-27-5 and 
Utah Code §77-27-6. Therefore, under either the Smith or Andrews rule, the Court finds that 
application of the statutes to the petitioner in 1993 was retroactive. 
The second prong of the test outlined in Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) is 
whether the change in the law was substantive or procedural. In other words, will the change 
in the law increase the burden of punishment for the crime? Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 
2298 (1977). And more specifically, whether the application of Utah Code §77-27-5 through 
an order of restitution increases the punishment ordered at sentencing. 
In Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action, 677 P.2d 943, 944 (Ariz. App. 1984), 
the court addressed this issue and held that a statutory amendment which authorized the a 
juvenile court to order restitution operated as an ex post facto law when applied to acts which 
occurred before the act's effective date. To determine whether an act is ex post facto, the court 
must analyze whether the statute has been applied retroactively, and whether the application 
works a disadvantage to the offender. Id. at 945. The court stated that "not only was the 
sanction for the unlawful activity increased to permit the imposition of a fine and restitution 
where they were not permissible at the time appellant committed the act, but the conditions of 
release on parole were modified to make payment of court ordered monetary reimbursement or 
assessments a condition of release. This is the type of legal disadvantage which was disapproved 
in Weaver* Id. at946. 
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Applying the law to the facts in this case, the Court finds that the petitioner was 
sentenced on February 13,1985, two months before the effective date of Utah Code 77-27-5 and 
Utah Code §77-27-6. Therefore, under either the Smith or Andrews rule, the Court finds that 
application of the statutes to the petitioner in 1993 was retroactive. 
The second prong of the test outlined in Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) is 
whether the change in the law was substantive or procedural. In other words, will the change 
in the law increase the burden of punishment for the crime? Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 
2298 (1977). And more specifically, whether the application of Utah Code §77-27-5 through 
an order of restitution increases the punishment ordered at sentencing. 
In Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action, 677 P.2d 943,944 (Ariz.App. 1984), 
the court addressed this issue and held that a statutory amendment which authorized the a 
juvenile court to order restitution operated as an ex post facto law when applied to acts which 
occurred before the act's effective date. To determine whether an act is ex post facto, the court 
must analyze whether the statute has been applied retroactively, and whether the application 
works a disadvantage to the offender. Id. at 945. The court stated that "not only was the 
sanction for the unlawful activity increased to permit the imposition of a fine and restitution 
where they were not permissible at the time appellant committed the act, but the conditions of 
release on parole were modified to make payment of court ordered monetary reimbursement or 
assessments a condition of release. This is the type of legal disadvantage which was disapproved 
in Weaver" Id. at946. 
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Likewise, in the case at hand, when Stllings was sentenced, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole did not have even the ostensible authority to order parolees to pay restitution. Clearly 
such an order, imposed as a condition of parole, substantially increases the punishment imposed 
by the sentencing court. Therefore, the Court finds that this statute, which purports to authorize 
the Board to order restitution, is substantive in making the punishment for the crime more 
burdensome, and is violative of Utah Code §68-3-3, as well as the ban on ex post facto laws 
established by the Utah constitution and the United States Constitution. 
The petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
DATED this / ^ liav of October, 1995. 
LESLIE A. LEWII 
DISTRICT COUR' 
O O O I < H 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Court Order, to 
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M. David Eckersley 
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Attorney for Petitioner 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Martha S. Stonebrook 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
Utah Const, art. I, section 18 
Art. I, § 18 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 25 Am. Jur. 2d Elections C.J.S. — 29 CJ.S. Elections § 6. 
§§ 4 to 7. Key Numbers. — Elections «=> 7. 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing con-
tracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall be passed. 
History: Const 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Bill of attainder. 
Criminal punishment. 
Ex post facto laws. 
Impairment of contracts. 
Ex post facto. 
Bill of attainder. 
A bill of attainder is one that imposes guilt, 
and inflicts punishment, upon an identifiable 
individual or group without judicial process; 
county ordinance prohibiting massages by 
members of the opposite sex, with certain ex-
ceptions, was not a bill of attainder where no 
identifiable individual or group was, by opera-
tion of the ordinance alone, the subject of legis-
lative punishment without due process. Red-
wood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624 
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981). 
Criminal punishment. 
An amendment of a criminal statute which 
lessens punishment controls the sentence pro-
nounced after the effective date of the amend-
ment, even where pronouncement was delayed 
by defendant's unlawful failure to appear for 
sentencing. Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 380, 
483 P.2d 425 (1971). 
Ex post facto laws. 
Law requiring state officers to give bond 
within certain time after beginning of term, 
which was enacted subsequent to beginning of 
term of officer, was not retroactive divesting 
vested rights, impairing obligation of contract 
or imposing new obligations. State ex rel. Stain 
v. Christensen, 84 Utah 185, 35 P.2d 775 
(1934). 
Neither the federal nor state Constitution 
has any provision in terms prohibiting retroac-
tive legislation — excepting that which forbids 
the enactment of ex post facto laws. Garrett 
Freight Lines v. State Tax Comm'n, 103 Utah 
390, 135 P.2d 523, 146 A.L.R. 1003 (1943). 
Impairment of contracts. 
Change or limitation of remedy, which does 
not materially abndge right, does not impair 
obligation of contract. Kirkman v. Bird, 22 
Utah 100, 61 P. 338, 58 L.R.A. 669, 83 Am. St. 
R. 774 (1900); Salter v. Nelson, 85 Utah 460, 
39 P.2d 1061 (1935). 
Former statute which exempted to married 
men, or heads of families, their earnings from 
personal services rendered within 60 days next 
preceding levy of execution, by garnishment or 
otherwise, held not to have impaired obligation 
of contracts entered into prior to its enactment. 
Kirkman v. Bird, 22 Utah 100, 61 P. 338, 58 
L.R.A. 669, 83 Am. St. R. 774 (1900). 
Former law, increasing homestead exemp-
tion from $1000 to $1500, was not invalid as 
impairing obligation of contracts. Folsom v. 
Asper, 25 Utah 299, 71 P. 315 (1903). 
The power to fix rates having been retained 
by the state under the Public Utilities Act, the 
action of the commission in fixing rates to be 
charged by street railway company notwith-
standing city ordinance granting street rail-
way franchise to operate railway over streets, 
did not in any manner result in impairment of 
contract. Murray City v. Utah Light & Trac-
tion Co., 56 Utah 437, 191 P. 421 (1920). 
Regulation of rates for public utilities is gov-
ernmental function coming directly within po-
lice power of state, and for that reason the es-
tablishing or modifying of rates, although con-
tractual, does not violate this provision. United 
States Smelting, Ref. & Milling Co. v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 58 Utah 168, 197 P. 902 
(1921). 
Provision of Workmen's Compensation Act 
which provides that, when any injury is caused 
by wrongful act of third person, claimant must 
elect whether to take compensation under act 
or to pursue his remedy against third person is 
valid as against contention that it impairs obli-
gation of contract of employment. Leva v. Utah 
Fuel Co., 58 Utah 388, 199 P. 659 (1921). 
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Utah Const, art. VII, section 12 (1991) 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Art. VII, § 12 
Sec. 12. [Board of Pardons — Respites and reprieves.] 
Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Justices of the Supreme 
Court and Attorney General shall constitute a Board of Pardons, a majority of 
whom, including the Governor, upon such conditions as may be established by 
the Legislature, may remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishments, and 
grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason and impeach-
ments, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law, relative to the 
manner of applying for pardons; but no fine or forfeiture shall be remitted, 
and no commutation or pardon granted, except after a full hearing before the 
Board, in open session, after previous notice of the time and place of such 
hearing has been given. The proceedings and decisions of the Board, with the 
reasons therefor in each case, together with the dissent of any member who 
may disagree, shall be reduced to writing, and filed with all papers used upon 
the hearing, in the office of such officer as provided by law. 
The Governor shall have power to grant respites or reprieves in all cases of 
convictions for offenses against the State, except treason or conviction on 
impeachment; but such respites or reprieves shall not extend beyond the next 
session of the Board of Pardons; and such Board, at such session, shall con-
tinue or determine such respite or reprieve, or they may commute the punish-
ment, or pardon the offense as herein provided. In case of conviction for 
treason, the Governor shall have the power to suspend execution of the sen-
tence, until the case shall be reported to the Legislature at its next regular 
session, when the Legislature shall either pardon, or commute the sentence, 
or direct its execution; and the Governor shall communicate to the Legislature 
at each regular session, each case of remission of fine or forfeiture, reprieve, 
commutation or pardon granted since the last previous report, stating the 
name of the convict, the crime for which convicted, the sentence and its date, 
the date of remission, commutation, pardon or reprieve, with the reasons for 
granting the same, and the objections, if any, of any member of the Board 
made thereto. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1979, S.J.R. 7. 
ANALYSIS 
Composition of board. 
Condition for termination of sentence. 
Exclusiveness of pardoning power. 
Good time allowances. 
Minimum mandatory sentence. 
Power to commute punishments. 
Suspension of sentence as exercise of pardon-
ing power. 
Composition of board. 
Legislature is given power and authority to 
change the personnel of the board of pardons. 
Cardisco v. Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64 P.2d 216 
(1937). 
The phrase "until otherwise provided by 
law" in this section means until otherwise pro-
vided by Legislature and does not mean until 
changed by constitutional amendment so that 
statute providing for make-up of board of par-
dons was valid and board had legal status. 
Adriano v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 350, 437 P.2d 
891 (1968). 
Condition for termination of sentence. 
Condition for termination of sentence im-
posed by board of pardons that prisoner agree 
to leave state was not unconstitutional as 
amounting to banishment. Mansell v. Turner, 
14 Utah 2d 352, 384 P.2d 394 (1963). 
Exclusiveness of pardoning power. 
Under this section, only board of pardons has 
right to commute punishments and grant par-
dons. State ex rel. Bishop v. State Bd. of Cors., 
16 Utah 478, 52 P. 1090 (1898). 
Statute, giving power of parole to board of 
corrections, held invalid as in conflict with this 
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Sec. 12. [Board of Pardons and Parole —Appointment — 
Powers and procedures — Governor's powers 
and duties — Legislature's powers.] 
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The Governor shall 
appoint the members of the board with the consent of the Senate. The terms of 
office shall be as provided by statute. 
(2) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and upon other 
conditions as provided by statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfei-
tures and restitution orders, commute punishments, and grant pardons 
after convictions, in all cases except treason and impeachments, subject to 
regulations as provided by statute. 
(b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may not be remitted and a 
commutation, parole, or pardon may not be granted except after a full 
hearing before the board, in open session, and after previous notice of the 
time and place of the hearing has been given. 
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, the reasons therefor in 
each case, and the dissent of any member who may disagree shall be 
recorded and filed as provided by statute with all papers used upon the 
hearing. 
(3) (a) The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all cases of 
convictions for offenses against the state except treason or conviction on 
impeachment. These respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next 
session of the board. At that session, the board shall continue or determine 
the respite or reprieve, commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as 
provided in this section. 
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may suspend execu-
tion of the sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next 
annual general session, when the Legislature shall pardon or commute the 
sentence, or direct its execution. If the Legislature takes no action on the 
case before adjournment of that session, the sentence shall be executed. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1979, S.JJL 7; approved by the electors on November 3,1992, 
1992, SJUL 8, { 6. and took effect on January 1,1993. The amend-
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- ment rewrote the section, 
ment was proposed by Laws 1992, S. J.R. 8, § 6, 
Sec. 13. [Repealed.] 
Repeals. — Laws 1992, S.J.R. 8, § 11 pro- by law; and no such claim against the State 
posed repealing this section, which read "Until shall be passed upon by the Legislature with-
otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Attor- out having been considered and acted upon by 
ney General, and State Auditor shall constitute the Board of Examiners." The repeal was ap-
a Board of Examiners, with power to examine proved by the electors of the state to take effect 
all such ciaims against the State as-provided by on January 1,1993. 
law, and perform such other duties as provided 
Sec. 14. [Duties of Lieutenant Governor.] 
The Lieutenant Governor shall: 
(1) serve on all boards and commissions in lieu of the Governor 
whenever so designated by the Governor; 
(2) perform such duties as may be delegated by the Governor; and 
(3) perform other duties as may be provided by statute. 
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77-27-16. Revocation of parole — Procedure. 
77-27-17. Discharge from parole — Application of parole time to sentence. 
77-27-18. County attorney to furnish information. 
77-27-19. Peace officer status of adult probation and parole section agents. 
77-27-20. Violating terms of probation. 
77-27-21. Clinics and examinations. 
77-27-22. Criminal identification bureau records. 
77-27-23. Adult probation and parole section created — Parole and probation districts — 
Employees in classified service. 
77-27-24. Out-of-state supervision of probationers and parolees — Authority to enter into 
compacts. 
77-27-25. Amendments to interstate compacts — Transfer of prisoners — Costs — Supple-
mentary agreements. 
77-27-26. Deputization of agents to effect return of parole and probation violators. 
77-27-27. Retaking or reincarceration for parole or probation violations — Hearing and 
notice to sending state — Detention of parolee or probationer. 
77-27-28. Hearing officer. 
77-27-29. Rights of parolee or probationer — Record of proceedings. 
77-27-30. Violation by parolee or probationer supervised in another state — Hearing in other 
state — Procedure upon receipt of record from other state. 
77-27-31. Short title. 
77-27-1. Definitions. As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Pardon" is an act of grace by an appropriate authority exempting 
a person from punishment for a crime; 
(2) "Parole" is a release from imprisonment on prescribed conditions 
which, if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, entitles him to a termina-
tion of his sentence; 
(3) "Commutation" is the change from a greater to a lesser punishment 
after conviction; 
(4) "Termination" is the act of an appropriate authority discharging 
from parole or concluding the sentence of imprisonment prior to the expi-
ration of the sentence; 
(5) "Reprieve or respite" is the temporary suspension of the execution 
of the sentence; 
(6) "Expiration" occurs when the maximum sentence has run; and 
(7) "Probation" is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposi-
tion or execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed condi-
tions. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-1, enacted by L. Cross-References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Board of pardons, governor's power to 
grant respites and reprieves, Const. Art. VII, 
§12. 
Termination or discharge of parolee from 
sentence, 76-3-202. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Amnesty distinguished. of which he had been convicted, while 
A pardon was to be distinguished from amnesty obliterated an offense before convic-
amnesty in that the former relieved an tion. United States v. Bassett (1887) 5 U 131, 
offender from the consequences of an offense *3 P 237, reversed on another point 137 US 
496, 34 L Ed 762,11 S Ct 165. 
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77-27-2. Board of pardons within department of social services — 
Establishment — Membership — Three-member panels — Qualifica-
tions and appointment — Terms — Vacancies — Removal. There is 
established within the department of social services a board of pardons, 
which shall consist of five part-time members, all of whom shall be resi-
dent citizens of the State of Utah, and who shall be appointed by the board 
of corrections. The board may sit as a panel of three members, the chair-
man or, in the absence of the chairman, the vice chairman, and two rotat-
ing members constituting such a panel. Such panel, by majority decision, 
may act for the entire board to determine whether parole, pardon, commu-
tation, termination of sentence, or remission of fines and forfeitures shall 
be granted in individual cases, but a majority decision by the entire board 
shall be required for adoption of rules, regulations or policies of general 
applicability pursuant to section 77-27-7. The present members of the state 
board of pardons are to continue to serve and shall become the members 
of the board of pardons until the terms for which they were appointed 
shall expire and until their respective successors shall be appointed and 
qualified. Thereafter, each member of the board of pardons shall hold office 
for four years and until his successor shall be appointed and qualified. No 
member shall serve more than two consecutive terms. Any vacancy occur-
ring in the membership of the board of pardons otherwise than by expira-
tion of the term, shall be filled in the same manner as those occurring by 
expiration of term, but for the unexpired term only. Any member of the 
board of pardons may be removed from office prior to expiration of the 
member's term by the board of corrections for cause, after proper notice 
and hearing. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-2, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
 P a r d o n | m d P a r o i e ^ 5> 1 4 .1 4 < 22. 
Crass-References. 67A CJS Pardon and Parole §§6-8, 10, 
Creation of department of social services 39-60. 
and boards and divisions within department, 59 AmJur 2d 53-75, Pardon and Parole 
63-35-3. §§ 77-102. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Constitutionality. until otherwise provided by legislature and 
Constitutional provision that "until other- did not mean until changed by constitutional 
wise provided by law, the governor, justices amendment; statute providing for make-up of 
of the Supreme Court and attorney general board of pardons was valid. Adriano v. 
shall constitute a board of pardons" meant Turner (1968) 20 U 2d 350, 437 P 2d 891. 
77-27-3. Duties of board — Decisions final — Governor's power — 
Restitution as condition. (1) The board of pardons shall determine, by 
majority decision, when and under what conditions, subject to the provi-
sions of this chapter, persons now or hereafter serving sentences, in all 
cases except treason or impeachments, or as otherwise limited by law, may 
be released upon parole, pardoned, or have their fines or forfeitures 
remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. No fine or forfeiture 
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shall be remitted, no parole, pardon or commutation granted or sentence 
terminated, except after a full hearing before the board in open session 
and after appropriate prior notice to the defendant of the time and place 
of the hearing has been given. The orders and decisions of the board of 
pardons and any dissent thereto shall be reduced to writing. 
(2) The determinations and decisions of the board of pardons in cases 
involving approval or denial of any action whatsoever, of paroles, pardons, 
commutations or terminations of sentence, or remission of fines and forfei-
tures shall be final. 
(3) Nothing herein shall be construed as a denial of or limitation on 
the governor's power to grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convic-
tions for offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on 
impeachment; however, such respites or reprieves shall not extend beyond 
the next session of the board of pardons and the board, at such session, 
shall continue or determine such respite or reprieve, or it may commute 
the punishment, or pardon the offense as herein provided. In the case of 
conviction for treason, the governor has the power to suspend execution 
of the sentence, until the case shall be reported to the legislature at its 
next session, when the legislature shall either pardon or commute the sen-
tence, or direct its execution. 
In determining when and where and under what conditions persons now 
or hereafter serving sentences may be released upon parole, pardoned or 
have their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or 
terminated, the state board of pardons shall consider whether such persons 
have made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accord-
ance with the standards and procedures of section 76-3-201, as a condition 
of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, commutation or ter-
mination of sentence. 
If the state board of pardons determines that restitution is inappropri-
ate, the state board of pardons shall state in writing as a part of the record 
of proceedings, the reasons for the decision. 
(4) Whenever the state board of pardons orders the release on parole 
of an inmate who has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to sec-
tion 76-3-201, but with respect to whom payment of all or a portion of the 
restitution was suspended until his release from imprisonment, the board 
may establish a schedule by which payment of the restitution may be 
resumed. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled inmate's per-
formance thereunder the board may consider the factors specified in sec-
tion 76-3-201 (3). The board may provide to the sentencing court a copy 
of the schedule and any modifications thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-3, enacted by L. (1); and added the last two paragraphs of 
1980, ch. 15, § % L. 1981, ch. 59, % Z. subsec. (3). 
n ., , -T A Collateral References. 
CompJert Notes.
 p a r ( J o n ^ p a r o , e ^ 5 ^ ^ 
The 1981 amendment inserted "to the 67A CJS Pardon and Parole §§6-8, 10, 
defendant" in the second sentence of subsec 39-60. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS constitute a board of pardons* meant until 
otherwise provided by legislature and did not 
Constitutionality
 m e a n mt]i changed by constitutional amend-
Cited ment, statute providing for make-up of board of 
ri~~~+i^+i~~~\:+„ pardons was valid Adnano v Turner, 20 Utah 
Constitutionality. ,. , «.
 f , f. 2d 350, 437 P 2d 891 (1968) 
Constitutional provision that "until other- ' **««*••• v**w/ 
wise provided by law, the governor, justices of Cited in State v Bishop, 717 P2d 261 (Utah 
the Supreme Court and attorney general shall 1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am Jur 2d Pardon and Key Numbers. — Pardon and Parole *=» 65 
Parole §§ 10, 12,17, 73 et seq 
CJJ5. — 67A C J S Pardon and Parole §§ 6 
to 8, 10, 39 to 60 
77-27-3. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 77-27-3 (L 1980, ch 15, relating to duties of the board, hearings, etc, 
§ 2, 1981, ch 59, § 3, 1983, ch 88, § 36), was repealed by Laws 1985, ch 213, § 10 
77-27-4. Chairperson and vice chairperson. 
(1) The governor shall select one of the members of the board to serve as 
chairperson and board administrator at the governor's pleasure The chairper-
son may exercise the duties and powers, in addition to those estabhshed by this 
chapter, necessary for the administration of daily operations of the board, 
including personnel, budgetary matters, panel appointments, and scheduling 
of hearings. 
(2) The chairperson shall appoint a vice chairperson to act in the absence of 
the chairperson. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-4, enacted by L. 1985, ch 198, § 8 repealed former § 77-27-4 
1985, ch 198, § 8; 1989, ch. 112, § 1; 1990, (L 1980, ch 15, § 2,1983, ch 53, § 2), relating 
ch. 195, § 3. to chairman and vice chairman and quorum of 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws board, and enacted present § 77-27-4 
77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority 
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and 
other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A 
misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except 
treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released 
upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, 
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated 
(b) The board may sit together or m panels to conduct hearings The 
chair shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and m 
accordance with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings 
involving commutation and pardons The chair may participate on any 
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panel and when doing so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may 
designate the chair for any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution 
remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence termi-
nated, except after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed 
examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other 
than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing 
before the board. 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole 
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the 
hearing shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's 
office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law 
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, 
and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include 
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by 
the board under that section This information shall be provided in terms 
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole in cases involving paroles, 
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission 
of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing 
in this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the 
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. 
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or 
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or 
pardon the offense as provided In the case of conviction for treason, the 
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to 
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or 
commute the sentence, or direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders 
serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have 
their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, 
the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider whether the persons have 
made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with 
the standards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole, 
pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or commutation or termination of 
sentence. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1986, ch. 22, § 2; 1988, ch. 
172, § 2; 1990, ch. 195, § 4; 1993, ch. 38, 
§ 102; 1994, ch. 13, § 33. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1963, ch 53, § 3 repealed a former § 77-27-5 
(L 1980, ch 15, § 2), relating to per diem and 
expenses of board members, and enacted a new 
§ 77-27-5 
Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1 repealed former 
§ 77-27-5 (L 1983, ch 53, § 3), relating to 
compensation and expenses of board and en-
acted the present section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or dis-
trict" near the middle of Subsection (2)(a) 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" throughout the section and 
substituted "chair" for "chairperson" through-
out Subsection (lib) 
720 
91 PARDONS AND PAROLES 77-27-5 
HUtory: C. 1963, 77-24-1, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 10, § 1; 1995, eh- 104,ft 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection 
(lXd) and made related changes. 
77-24-1.5. Safekeeping by officer pending disposition — 
Records required — Stray animals. 
(1) Each peace officer shall: 
(a) hold custodial property in safe custody: 
(i) until it is received into evidence; or 
(ii) if it is not used as evidence, until it can be disposed of as 
provided in this chapter; and 
(b) maintain a proper record of the custodial property that identifies: 
(i) the owner of the custodial property, if known; and 
(ii) the case for which it was taken or received and is being held. 
(2) (a) Each municipal or county animal control officer shall hold any 
unidentified or unclaimed stray dog or stray cat in safe and humane 
custody for a minimum of three working days after the time of impound 
prior to making any final disposition of the animal, including: 
(i) placement in an adoptive home; or 
(ii) euthanasia. 
(b) An unidentified or unclaimed stray dog or stray cat may be 
euthanized prior to the completion of the three working day minimum 
holding period to prevent unnecessary suffering due to serious injury or 
disease, if the euthanasia is in compliance with written established agency 
or department policies and procedures, and with any local ordinances 
allowing the destruction. 
(c) An unidentified or unclaimed stray dog or stray cat shall be returned 
to its owner upon proof of ownership and upon compliance with require-
ments of local animal control ordinances. 
History: C. 1953, 77-24-1.5, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 10, § 2; 1995, ch. 104, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, redesignated for-
mer Subsections (1) and (2) as Subsections 
(l)(a) and (1Kb) and added Subsection (2). 
CHAPTER 27 
PARDONS AND PAROLES 
Section 
77-27-5. 
77-27-6. 
77-27-9. 
77-27-21.5. 
Board of Pardons and Parole 
authority. 
Payment of restitution. 
Parole proceedings [Effective 
April 29, 1996]. 
Sex offender registration — In-
formation system — Law en-
forcement and courts to re-
port — Registration — 
Penalty — Temporary re-
leases — Effect of 
expungement. 
77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority 
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and 
other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A 
misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except 
treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released 
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upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, 
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The 
chair shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and in 
accordance with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings 
involving commutation and pardons. The chair may participate on any 
panel and when doing so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may 
designate the chair for any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution 
remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence termi-
nated, except after a full hearing before the board or the boards appointed 
examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other 
than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing 
before the board. 
(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount that does not 
exceed complete restitution if determined by the court in accordance with 
Section 76-3-201. 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole 
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the 
hearing shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's 
office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law 
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, 
and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include 
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by 
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms 
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole in cases involving paroles, 
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission 
of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing 
in this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, 
including restitution as provided in Section 77-27-6. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the 
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. 
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or 
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or 
pardon the offense as provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the 
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to 
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or 
commute the sentence, or direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders 
serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have 
their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, 
the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider whether the persons have 
made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with 
the standards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole, 
pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or commutation or termination of 
sentence. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-5, enacted by L. 172, § 2; 1990, ch. 195, § 4; 1993, ch. 38, 
1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1986, ch. 22,5 2; 1988, ch. § 102; 1994, ch. 13, ft 33; 1995, ch. 301, S 4. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Retroactive application. minish the opportunity for commutation that 
, was available at the time the crime was com-
—C^natitutionality. mitted, in violation of Utah Const, Art. I, Sec. 
For the Board of Pardons to apply the sub-
 l g prohibiting ex post facto laws. Andrews v. 
stantive standards in Subsections (6) and (7) of 
this section in deciding whether to grant a 
petition for a commutation hearing would di-
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 836 R2d 790 (Utah 1992). 
77-27-6. Payment of restitution. 
(1) When the Board of Pardons and Parole orders the release on parole of an 
inmate who has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to Section 
76-3-201 or whom the board has ordered to make restitution, and aD or a 
portion of restitution is still owing, the board may establish a schedule by 
which payment of the restitution shall be made, or order community service in 
lieu of or in combination with restitution. In fixing the schedule and supervis-
ing the paroled offender's performance, the board may consider the factors 
specified in Subsection 76-3-201(3). 
(2) The board may impose any court order for restitution and order that a 
defendant make restitution in an amount not to exceed the pecuniary damages 
to the victim or victims of the offense of which the defendant has been 
convicted, or the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted to by the 
defendant to the sentencing court, unless the board applying the criteria as set 
forth in Subsection 76-3-201(3)(b) determines that restitution is inappropriate. 
(3) The board may also make orders of restitution for recovery of any or all 
costs incurred by the Department of Corrections or the state or any other 
agency arising out of the defendant's needs or conduct. 
(4) If parole is terminated or the sentence expires while restitution is still 
owed, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall forward a restitution order to the 
sentencing court to be entered on the judgment docket. The entry shall 
constitute a lien and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in 
a civil judgment. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-6, enacted by L. ment, effective May 3, 1993, added subsection 
1985, ch. 213, § 2; 1986, ch. 22, § 3; 1993, ch. designations and Subsection (4). 
124, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 35. The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
1985, ch 213, § 2 repealed former § 77-27-6 "Board of Pardons" in Subsections (1) and (4) 
(L 1980, ch. 15, § 2), relating to meetings of Cross-References. — Judgments, U R C.P. 
the board, and enacted present § 77-27-6.
 5 4 e t s e q 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
77-27-7. Parole or hearing dates — Interview — Hearings 
— Report of alienists — Mental competency. 
(1) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine within six months 
after the date of an offender's commitment to the custody of the Department of 
Corrections, for serving a sentence upon conviction of a felony or class A 
misdemeanor offense, a date upon which the offender shall be afforded a 
hearing to establish a date of release or a date for a rehearing, and shall 
promptly notify the offender of the date. 
(2) Before reaching a final decision to release any offender under this 
chapter, the chair shall cause the offender to appear before the board, its panel, 
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